Yemen's Secret War: The Untold Story of Mercenary Operations

The Night of December 29, 2015

On a quiet night in Aden, Yemen, the silence was suddenly shattered by gunfire. Unmarked cars slipped through the shadows of the city, carrying American and French mercenaries on a mission from a foreign prince. Their target: an office building where a suspected terrorist leader was meeting with his allies.

At 9:57 PM, the cars reached their destination. The operators exited their vehicles, intending to plant a bomb on the office doors. However, their plans were quickly derailed as shots rang out, igniting a chaotic firefight in the once-peaceful neighborhood.

Forced to improvise, the team managed to secure the bomb to the front door before piling back into one of their vehicles. They left another car behind, packed with explosives. As the team sped away, two explosions rocked the city in quick succession, demolishing the building and spreading confusion throughout Aden.

The Spear Operations Group

The team members weren't operating under any official French or American flag, despite some being reservists in the Navy SEALs and the Maryland National Guard. Instead, they were working as contractors for a private security company called Spear Operations Group. Their employer? The United Arab Emirates (UAE), with orders coming directly from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed himself.

Spear Operations Group is a small but highly specialized company, comprising just 12 members drawn from across the special operations community. Its ranks include veterans from:

• CIA Special Activities Center
• US Army Delta Force
• French Foreign Legion

This assemblage of elite operators forms what could be described as an all-star team of combat specialists from around the world. These veterans bring with them a wealth of experience in intelligence gathering and surveillance techniques - skills crucial for executing sensitive missions like the one in Aden.

Spear Group asserts that they put these skills to good use, ensuring that each target was thoroughly vetted as a legitimate threat before accepting any contract. However, this claim has been met with skepticism from international news agencies and human rights groups.

The UAE's Involvement

In late 2015, Yemen was deeply embroiled in a civil war. The UAE government, seeking to maintain control over the strategic southern Yemeni port city of Aden and its vital infrastructure, may have seen the al-Islah political party as a threat to their interests.

Critics argue that the mission undertaken by Spear Operations Group was essentially militarized contract killing - a plausible way to assassinate political targets that are supposed to be off-limits. This approach allows countries to sidestep international laws and norms, as private military companies don't have the same accountability and reporting standards as state institutions.

Human rights groups claim that some of the targets had insufficient justification for elimination, even by official military standards, let alone those of a private contractor. Abraham Golan, the head of Spear Group, doesn't shy away from these allegations. He stated plainly, "There was a targeted assassination program in Yemen. I was running it. We did it."

Despite these controversies, Spear Operations Group maintains that they only pursued verified terrorists and operated exclusively through legal means.

Abraham Golan: The Man Behind Spear Group

To understand how Spear Operations Group came to work for the UAE government, we need to look at the company's enigmatic CEO, Abraham Golan.

Golan's background is as colorful as it is difficult to verify independently. Here's what we can reasonably ascertain about his history:

• Born in Hungary to Israeli parents
• Educated in Paris
• Joined the French Foreign Legion
• Fought in numerous conflicts around the world in the 1980s and 1990s

The French Foreign Legion played a crucial role in shaping Golan's future. Famous for allowing foreign nationals to serve in the French military, the Legion offered Golan an opportunity to acquire the skills that would prove invaluable in building a private contractor business.

Golan's multilingual abilities, multiple citizenships, and tactical knowledge made him uniquely suited to work with people from diverse backgrounds around the world. His rise through the ranks paints a picture of a man who prioritized mission accomplishment over ethical considerations.

Some of Golan's claimed experiences include:

• Working with Serbian mob boss turned paramilitary leader Arkan during the Yugoslav wars
• Guarding oil rigs and tankers off the coast of Nigeria
• Socializing in London with Mossad Chief Danny Yatom

An unnamed CIA official described Golan as "prone to exaggeration, but for crazy [operations], he's kind of the guy you hire."

The UAE Contract

Golan's reputation for taking on challenging jobs led to an unlikely meeting with a potential employer. He flew to a UAE military base in Abu Dhabi to meet with one of the crown prince's key advisors.

The meeting took place in an Italian restaurant within the base's officers' club. The key advisor turned out to be none other than Mohammed Dahlan, the former security chief for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Now serving as Crown Prince bin Zayed's right-hand man, Dahlan had a reputation for cunning and brutality that had helped keep the kingdom in line.

Dahlan's first words to Golan, an Israeli dual citizen with a long history of working alongside the IDF, were telling: "In any other context, we'd be trying to kill each other." But this was business, not personal.

Dahlan wanted to know why they should hire Golan and his American troops for Spear Group over using the UAE's own military for the job. Golan's response was bold: "Give me your best man, and I'll beat him." When Dahlan pointed to the young female aide sitting next to him and said, "She's my best man," the tension was diffused, and the group sat down to hash out the details of the contract.

The plan went far beyond any contract that Golan or his associate Isaac Gilmore had ever worked before. The team would be given a list of leaders and associates from the al-Islah political party in Yemen. Al-Islah is a subsidiary of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE has declared a terrorist organization. This designation made destroying the al-Islah party a counterterrorism operation in the eyes of the UAE.

While the word "assassination" was never explicitly used during the meeting, Mohammed Dahlan made it very clear that the team's mission was not to detain or capture these individuals. As Gilmore later recounted in an interview, "It was very specific that we were targeting these individuals."

A BBC report would later uncover that many of the targets on the list were regular sheiks, politicians, activists, and community leaders. However, the financial incentives were significant enough to discourage too much scrutiny. The team would be paid $1.5 million US per month, plus bonuses for each successful operation.

Recruiting the Team

This lucrative contract allowed Spear Group to attract some of the most highly skilled veterans to their team. Working for a Private Military Company (PMC) doesn't always offer the kind of excitement that former Special Forces operators are looking for. Often, the missions assigned to PMCs involve mundane tasks like protecting dignitaries or guarding ships at sea for months on end with little action.

However, this mission promised both guaranteed combat and a starting rate of $25,000 a month. For many veterans, this combination of high-stakes action and substantial pay was too tempting to pass up.

Legal Considerations

The legal status of Spear Group's mission in Yemen was dubious at best. The United States and other major Western powers haven't designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, meaning that Spear Group was effectively targeting a legitimate political party in Yemen.

To provide extra legal cover, Golan negotiated a clause in their contract that would officially commission the team into the UAE military. This move was designed to protect the operators from potential legal repercussions under the 1989 International Convention against Mercenaries.

According to Article 47 of the Geneva Convention, a mercenary is defined by six key traits. By officially joining the UAE military, Spear Group aimed to invalidate point number five, which states that a mercenary "is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict."

Since the UAE was a recognized party to the conflict in Yemen, Spear Group operators were technically acting as official members of the Emirati military. This loophole was intended to shield them from being classified as mercenaries under international law.

Abraham Golan confirmed this motivation in a later interview, stating, "It's for judicial reasons because if [things go wrong], the UAE uniform and dog tags mark the difference between a mercenary and a military man."

The First Mission

Once in Yemen, the team prepared for their first operation. Their initial target was Anssaf Mayo, a leader of a local al-Islah chapter in Aden. Mayo had been spotted having a meeting in his office building, and Spear Group decided that explosives would be the most effective way to eliminate him.

On December 29, the team set out to carry out the assassination. Despite the unexpected firefight they encountered, they successfully demolished the office building. However, there was one significant problem: Mayo wasn't there. By sheer coincidence, he had left the building just ten minutes before the attack.

Although Mayo escaped death that night, the attempt on his life spooked him enough to flee to Saudi Arabia, where he currently lives in exile. Spear Group declared the mission a success anyway, with Golan asserting that by driving Mayo into hiding, they'd achieved the objective of neutralizing his influence in the region.

The UAE government seemed to approve of the outcome, as they subsequently sent Spear Group additional targets in Yemen as part of their ongoing counterterrorism campaign.

Aftermath and Implications

Spear Group won't disclose exactly how long they operated in Yemen, but we know that they went on to train the UAE military to conduct these missions themselves. This transfer of skills and tactics to UAE personnel created a template for future operations.

One report found that this led to a killing spree of over 160 assassinations over a three-year period. Meanwhile, members of Spear Group stand by their actions. Isaac Gilmore, a former Navy SEAL, reflected, "If I could do it over again, we would have been less risk-averse. We would have done some amazing things. Although we also could have done some amazing things and all ended up in jail."

The World of Private Military Companies

Private Military Companies (PMCs) aren't a new phenomenon. There are thousands of them around the world, ranging from small security consulting firms to large corporations. Russia's Wagner Group and the American company formerly known as Blackwater (now Academi) are two of the most recognizable examples in recent history, due to some of their more controversial missions over the past few decades.

It's important to note that many PMCs provide legitimate and necessary services. For instance, NGOs and medical groups often hire private security firms for protection when operating in dangerous areas. However, there is undeniably a dark side to this industry.

Many veterans turn to contractor work after leaving the military, attracted by the significantly higher pay compared to their military salaries. This work allows them to leverage their skills and experience in the private sector, often helping them to pay off debts, buy homes, and set up their post-military lives.

However, the world of PMCs is shadowy and complex, operating in a gray area of laws and ethics. What sets the Spear Operations Group apart in their mission in Yemen is that they weren't just hired as consultants or security specialists. Instead, they were handed a list of 23 individuals by the Emirati intelligence services and told that these were terrorists who needed to be eliminated - a case of "shoot first and ask questions later."

Legal and Ethical Considerations

U.S. laws make it illegal to "conspire to kill, kidnap, or maim someone in a foreign country." However, at the same time, the U.S. and many other nations don't outright ban mercenaries. In the United States, for example, their activities are indirectly regulated by the Arms Export Control Act. This means the State Department licenses these companies and monitors the implementation of their contracts to export their military services legally.

In the case of Spear Group's Yemen mission, the State Department denied ever issuing a license for this operation.

Proponents of PMCs argue that companies willing to take on these kinds of risky missions in legally gray areas are necessary to fight against new breeds of transnational terrorism. They contend that when fighting ruthless terror organizations, a certain level of moral flexibility is required.

Private military companies may even be more useful in the fight against terrorism precisely because they don't have all the bureaucratic trappings of a state institution. PMCs offer a fluid, flexible response that's more agile than even what special forces can provide.

In fact, the United States is one of the top employers of PMCs in conflict zones. Over the course of the Iraq War, the U.S. employed over 100,000 different PMC contractors. Both the U.S. and UK have declined to ratify new international treaties that strengthen laws against mercenaries.

This is the belief held by Spear Group founder Abraham Golan, who modeled the company's operations after Israel's own targeted elimination programs. Golan stated, "Maybe I'm a monster. Maybe I should be in jail. Maybe I'm a bad guy. But I'm right."

Conclusion

The story of Spear Operations Group and their mission in Yemen opens up a complex debate about the role of private military companies in modern warfare. It raises questions about the legality and ethics of using mercenaries for sensitive operations, the accountability of these groups, and the potential for abuse when operating in the shadows of international law.

As conflicts around the world continue to evolve, becoming more complex and often involving non-state actors, the demand for PMCs is likely to grow. This trend presents significant challenges for international law and ethics, as well as for the countries that employ these services.

The case of Spear Group in Yemen serves as a stark reminder of the potential consequences of outsourcing military operations to private entities. It highlights the need for greater oversight and regulation of PMCs, as well as a broader discussion about the role of these companies in modern warfare.

As we move forward, it's crucial that we continue to examine and debate these issues. The use of PMCs has the potential to reshape the landscape of international conflicts, and it's essential that we understand the implications of this shift. Only through open dialogue and careful consideration can we hope to navigate the complex ethical and legal terrain of modern warfare in the age of private military companies.

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